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Objective ID
Severity
Discussion
V-285226
medium
Limiting the number of concurrent sessions reduces the risk of denial-of-service (DoS) to the DNS implementation.
Infoblox DNS servers configured in a Grid do not use zone transfers. Data is replicated using an encrypted management connection. However, when a zone contains both Infoblox Grid DNS servers and non-Grid DNS servers, a DNS protocol-compliant zone transfer is performed. Name servers do not have direct user connections but accept client connections for queries. Original restriction on client connections should be high enough to prevent a self-imposed denial of service, after which the connections are monitored and fine-tuned to best meet the organization's specific requirements.
Primary name servers also make outbound connections to secondary name servers to provide zone transfers and accept inbound connection requests from clients wishing to provide a dynamic update. Primary name servers should explicitly limit zone transfers to be made only to designated secondary name servers. Because zone transfers involve the transfer of entire zones and use TCP connections, they place substantial demands on network resources relative to normal DNS queries. Errant or malicious frequent zone transfer requests on the name servers of the enterprise can overload the primary zone server and result in DoS to legitimate users. Primary name servers should be configured to limit the hosts from which they will accept dynamic updates.
Additionally, the number of concurrent clients, especially TCP clients, needs to be kept to a level that does not risk placing the system in a DoS state.
Infoblox DNS servers configured in a Grid do not use zone transfers. Data is replicated using an encrypted management connection. However, when a zone contains both Infoblox Grid DNS servers and non-Grid DNS servers, a DNS protocol-compliant zone transfer is performed. Name servers do not have direct user connections but accept client connections for queries. Original restriction on client connections should be high enough to prevent a self-imposed denial of service, after which the connections are monitored and fine-tuned to best meet the organization's specific requirements.
Primary name servers also make outbound connections to secondary name servers to provide zone transfers and accept inbound connection requests from clients wishing to provide a dynamic update. Primary name servers should explicitly limit zone transfers to be made only to designated secondary name servers. Because zone transfers involve the transfer of entire zones and use TCP connections, they place substantial demands on network resources relative to normal DNS queries. Errant or malicious frequent zone transfer requests on the name servers of the enterprise can overload the primary zone server and result in DoS to legitimate users. Primary name servers should be configured to limit the hosts from which they will accept dynamic updates.
Additionally, the number of concurrent clients, especially TCP clients, needs to be kept to a level that does not risk placing the system in a DoS state.
V-285227
medium
Limiting the number of concurrent sessions reduces the risk of denial-of-service (DoS) to the DNS implementation.
Name servers do not have direct user connections but accept client connections for queries. Original restriction on client connections should be high enough to prevent a self-imposed denial of service, after which the connections are monitored and fine-tuned to best meet the organization's specific requirements.
Primary name servers also make outbound connections to secondary name servers to provide zone transfers and accept inbound connection requests from clients wishing to provide a dynamic update. Primary name servers should explicitly limit zone transfers to be made only to designated secondary name servers. Because zone transfers involve the transfer of entire zones and use TCP connections, they place substantial demands on network resources relative to normal DNS queries. Errant or malicious frequent zone transfer requests on the name servers of the enterprise can overload the master zone server and result in DoS to legitimate users. Primary name servers should be configured to limit the hosts from which they will accept dynamic updates.
Additionally, the number of concurrent clients, especially TCP clients, needs to be kept to a level that does not risk placing the system in a DoS state.
Name servers do not have direct user connections but accept client connections for queries. Original restriction on client connections should be high enough to prevent a self-imposed denial of service, after which the connections are monitored and fine-tuned to best meet the organization's specific requirements.
Primary name servers also make outbound connections to secondary name servers to provide zone transfers and accept inbound connection requests from clients wishing to provide a dynamic update. Primary name servers should explicitly limit zone transfers to be made only to designated secondary name servers. Because zone transfers involve the transfer of entire zones and use TCP connections, they place substantial demands on network resources relative to normal DNS queries. Errant or malicious frequent zone transfer requests on the name servers of the enterprise can overload the master zone server and result in DoS to legitimate users. Primary name servers should be configured to limit the hosts from which they will accept dynamic updates.
Additionally, the number of concurrent clients, especially TCP clients, needs to be kept to a level that does not risk placing the system in a DoS state.
V-285229
high
The private keys in the KSK and ZSK key pairs must be protected from unauthorized access. If possible, the private keys should be stored offline (with respect to the internet-facing, DNSSEC-aware name server) in a physically secure, nonnetwork-accessible machine along with the zone file master copy.
This strategy is not feasible in situations in which the DNSSEC-aware name server must support dynamic updates. To support dynamic update transactions, the DNSSEC-aware name server (which usually is a primary authoritative name server) must have both the zone file master copy and the private key corresponding to the zone-signing key (ZSK-private) online to immediately update the signatures for the updated RRsets. The private key corresponding to the key-signing key (KSK-private) can still be kept offline.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000033-DNS-000111, SRG-APP-000176-DNS-000094, SRG-APP-000176-DNS-000096, SRG-APP-000915-DNS-000112, SRG-APP-000516-DNS-000108
This strategy is not feasible in situations in which the DNSSEC-aware name server must support dynamic updates. To support dynamic update transactions, the DNSSEC-aware name server (which usually is a primary authoritative name server) must have both the zone file master copy and the private key corresponding to the zone-signing key (ZSK-private) online to immediately update the signatures for the updated RRsets. The private key corresponding to the key-signing key (KSK-private) can still be kept offline.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000033-DNS-000111, SRG-APP-000176-DNS-000094, SRG-APP-000176-DNS-000096, SRG-APP-000915-DNS-000112, SRG-APP-000516-DNS-000108
V-285237
medium
Protection of log data includes ensuring log data is not accidentally lost or deleted. Backing up audit records to a different system or onto separate media than the system being audited on a defined frequency helps to ensure the audit records will be retained in the event of a catastrophic system failure.
This also helps to ensure a compromise of the information system being audited does not result in a compromise of the audit records.
This requirement only applies to applications that have a native backup capability for audit records. Operating system backup requirements cover applications that do not provide native backup functions.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000125-DNS-000012, SRG-APP-000226-DNS-000032
This also helps to ensure a compromise of the information system being audited does not result in a compromise of the audit records.
This requirement only applies to applications that have a native backup capability for audit records. Operating system backup requirements cover applications that do not provide native backup functions.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000125-DNS-000012, SRG-APP-000226-DNS-000032
V-285238
medium
To prevent unauthorized connection of devices, unauthorized transfer of information, or unauthorized tunneling (i.e., embedding of data types within data types), organizations must disable or restrict unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports/protocols on information systems.
Infoblox systems provide DNS, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), and IP Address Management (DDI) services. Some of the functions and services provided may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations. Additionally, it is sometimes convenient to provide multiple services from a single component (e.g., DNS and DHCP); however, doing so increases risk over limiting the services provided by any one component. This risk may be increased depending on placement in the network. Internal systems often provide DNS and DHCP; however, external systems or those in a DMZ provide only DNS.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000142-DNS-000014, SRG-APP-000383-DNS-000109, SRG-APP-000516-DNS-000500
Infoblox systems provide DNS, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), and IP Address Management (DDI) services. Some of the functions and services provided may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations. Additionally, it is sometimes convenient to provide multiple services from a single component (e.g., DNS and DHCP); however, doing so increases risk over limiting the services provided by any one component. This risk may be increased depending on placement in the network. Internal systems often provide DNS and DHCP; however, external systems or those in a DMZ provide only DNS.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000142-DNS-000014, SRG-APP-000383-DNS-000109, SRG-APP-000516-DNS-000500
V-285239
medium
To enable zone transfer (requests and responses) through authenticated messages, it is necessary to generate a key for every pair of name servers. The key also can be used for securing other transactions, such as dynamic updates, DNS queries, and responses. The binary key string that is generated by most key generation utilities used with DNSSEC is Base64-encoded. TSIG is a string used to generate the message authentication hash stored in a TSIG RR and used to authenticate an entire DNS message.
The process of authenticating the source of a message and its integrity through hash-based message authentication codes (HMAC) is specified through a set of DNS specifications known collectively as TSIG. The sender of the message uses the HMAC function to generate a MAC and sends this MAC along with the message to the receiver. The receiver, who shares the same secret key, uses the key and HMAC function used by the sender to compute the MAC on the received message. The receiver then compares the computed MAC with the received MAC; if the two values match, it provides assurance that the message has been received correctly and that the sender belongs to the community of users sharing the same secret key. Thus, message source authentication and integrity verification are performed in a single process. To enable zone transfer (requests and responses) through authenticated messages, it is necessary to generate a key for every pair of name servers. The key also can be used for securing other transactions, such as dynamic updates, DNS queries, and responses. The binary key string that is generated by most key generation utilities used with DNSSEC is Base64-encoded. TSIG is a string used to generate the message authentication hash stored in a TSIG RR and used to authenticate an entire DNS message.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000158-DNS-000076, SRG-APP-000158-DNS-000015, SRG-APP-000219-DNS-000028, SRG-APP-000349-DNS-000043, SRG-APP-000394-DNS-000049, SRG-APP-000395-DNS-000050
The process of authenticating the source of a message and its integrity through hash-based message authentication codes (HMAC) is specified through a set of DNS specifications known collectively as TSIG. The sender of the message uses the HMAC function to generate a MAC and sends this MAC along with the message to the receiver. The receiver, who shares the same secret key, uses the key and HMAC function used by the sender to compute the MAC on the received message. The receiver then compares the computed MAC with the received MAC; if the two values match, it provides assurance that the message has been received correctly and that the sender belongs to the community of users sharing the same secret key. Thus, message source authentication and integrity verification are performed in a single process. To enable zone transfer (requests and responses) through authenticated messages, it is necessary to generate a key for every pair of name servers. The key also can be used for securing other transactions, such as dynamic updates, DNS queries, and responses. The binary key string that is generated by most key generation utilities used with DNSSEC is Base64-encoded. TSIG is a string used to generate the message authentication hash stored in a TSIG RR and used to authenticate an entire DNS message.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000158-DNS-000076, SRG-APP-000158-DNS-000015, SRG-APP-000219-DNS-000028, SRG-APP-000349-DNS-000043, SRG-APP-000394-DNS-000049, SRG-APP-000395-DNS-000050
V-285243
medium
If maintenance tools are used by unauthorized personnel, they may accidentally or intentionally damage or compromise the system. The act of managing systems and applications includes the ability to access sensitive application information, such as system configuration details, diagnostic information, user information, and potentially sensitive application data.
Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the internet) or an internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities carried out by individuals physically present at the information system or information system component and not communicating across a network connection. Typically, strong authentication requires authenticators that are resistant to replay attacks and employ multifactor authentication. Strong authenticators include, for example, PKI where certificates are stored on a token protected by a password, passphrase, or biometric.
This requirement applies to hardware/software diagnostic test equipment or tools. This requirement does not cover hardware/software components that may support information system maintenance, yet are a part of the system (e.g., the software implementing "ping," "ls," "ipconfig," or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch).
Lack of authentication enables anyone to gain access to the network or possibly a network element that provides opportunity for intruders to compromise resources within the network infrastructure. Network access control mechanisms interoperate to prevent unauthorized access and to enforce the organization's security policy. Authorization for access to any network element requires an individual account identifier that has been approved, assigned, and configured on an authentication server. Authentication of all administrator accounts for all privilege levels must be accomplished using two or more factors that include the following:
(i) Something you know (e.g., password/PIN);
(ii) Something you have (e.g., cryptographic identification device, token); or
(iii) Something you are (e.g., biometric).
Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the internet) or an internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities carried out by individuals physically present at the information system or information system component and not communicating across a network connection. Typically, strong authentication requires authenticators that are resistant to replay attacks and employ multifactor authentication. Strong authenticators include, for example, PKI where certificates are stored on a token protected by a password, passphrase, or biometric.
This requirement applies to hardware/software diagnostic test equipment or tools. This requirement does not cover hardware/software components that may support information system maintenance, yet are a part of the system (e.g., the software implementing "ping," "ls," "ipconfig," or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch).
Lack of authentication enables anyone to gain access to the network or possibly a network element that provides opportunity for intruders to compromise resources within the network infrastructure. Network access control mechanisms interoperate to prevent unauthorized access and to enforce the organization's security policy. Authorization for access to any network element requires an individual account identifier that has been approved, assigned, and configured on an authentication server. Authentication of all administrator accounts for all privilege levels must be accomplished using two or more factors that include the following:
(i) Something you know (e.g., password/PIN);
(ii) Something you have (e.g., cryptographic identification device, token); or
(iii) Something you are (e.g., biometric).
V-285244
medium
The underlying feature in the major threat associated with DNS query/response (i.e., forged response or response failure) is the integrity of DNS data returned in the response. The security objective is to verify the integrity of each response received. An integral part of integrity verification is to ensure that valid data has originated from the right source. Establishing trust in the source is called data origin authentication.
The security objectives—and consequently the security services—that are required for securing the DNS query/response transaction are data origin authentication and data integrity verification.
The specification for a digital signature mechanism in the context of the DNS infrastructure is in IETF's DNSSEC standard. In DNSSEC, trust in the public key (for signature verification) of the source is established not by going to a third party or a chain of third parties (as in public key infrastructure [PKI] chaining), but by starting from a trusted zone (such as the root zone) and establishing the chain of trust down to the current source of response through successive verifications of signature of the public key of a child by its parent. The public key of the trusted zone is called the trust anchor.
The security objectives—and consequently the security services—that are required for securing the DNS query/response transaction are data origin authentication and data integrity verification.
The specification for a digital signature mechanism in the context of the DNS infrastructure is in IETF's DNSSEC standard. In DNSSEC, trust in the public key (for signature verification) of the source is established not by going to a third party or a chain of third parties (as in public key infrastructure [PKI] chaining), but by starting from a trusted zone (such as the root zone) and establishing the chain of trust down to the current source of response through successive verifications of signature of the public key of a child by its parent. The public key of the trusted zone is called the trust anchor.
V-285245
medium
If name server replies are invalid or cannot be validated, many networking functions and communication would be adversely affected. With DNS, the presence of delegation signer (DS) records associated with child zones informs clients of the security status of child zones. These records are crucial to the DNSSEC chain of trust model. Each parent domain's DS record is used to verify the DNSKEY record in its subdomain, from the top of the DNS hierarchy down.
A DNS server is an example of an information system providing name/address resolution service. Digital signatures and cryptographic keys are examples of additional artifacts. DNS resource records are examples of authoritative data. Applications other than the DNS, to map between host/service names and network addresses, must provide other means to ensure the authenticity and integrity of response data.
In DNS, trust in the public key of the source is established by starting from a trusted name server and establishing the chain of trust down to the current source of response through successive verifications of signature of the public key of a child by its parent.
A trust anchor is an authoritative entity represented via a public key and associated data. It is used in the context of public key infrastructures, X.509 digital certificates, and Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC).
When there is a chain of trust, usually the top entity to be trusted becomes the trust anchor. A certification path starts with the subject certificate and proceeds through a number of intermediate certificates up to a trusted root certificate. In DNS, a trust anchor is a DNSKEY that is placed into a validating resolver so the validator can cryptographically validate the results for a given request back to a known public key (the trust anchor).
An example means to indicate the security status of child subspaces is through the use of DS resource records in the DNS.
Path validation is necessary for a relying party to make an informed trust decision when presented with any certificate not already explicitly trusted. Without path validation and a chain of trust, there can be no trust that the data integrity authenticity has been maintained during a transaction.
A DNS server is an example of an information system providing name/address resolution service. Digital signatures and cryptographic keys are examples of additional artifacts. DNS resource records are examples of authoritative data. Applications other than the DNS, to map between host/service names and network addresses, must provide other means to ensure the authenticity and integrity of response data.
In DNS, trust in the public key of the source is established by starting from a trusted name server and establishing the chain of trust down to the current source of response through successive verifications of signature of the public key of a child by its parent.
A trust anchor is an authoritative entity represented via a public key and associated data. It is used in the context of public key infrastructures, X.509 digital certificates, and Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC).
When there is a chain of trust, usually the top entity to be trusted becomes the trust anchor. A certification path starts with the subject certificate and proceeds through a number of intermediate certificates up to a trusted root certificate. In DNS, a trust anchor is a DNSKEY that is placed into a validating resolver so the validator can cryptographically validate the results for a given request back to a known public key (the trust anchor).
An example means to indicate the security status of child subspaces is through the use of DS resource records in the DNS.
Path validation is necessary for a relying party to make an informed trust decision when presented with any certificate not already explicitly trusted. Without path validation and a chain of trust, there can be no trust that the data integrity authenticity has been maintained during a transaction.
V-285246
medium
The best way for a zone administrator to minimize the impact of a key compromise is by limiting the validity period of RRSIGs in the zone and in the parent zone. This strategy limits the time during which an attacker can take advantage of a compromised key to forge responses. An attacker that has compromised a ZSK can use that key only during the KSK's signature validity interval. An attacker that has compromised a KSK can use that key for only as long as the signature interval of the RRSIG covering the DS RR in the delegating parent. These validity periods should be short, which will require frequent re-signing.
To prevent the impact of a compromised KSK, a delegating parent should set the signature validity period for RRSIGs covering DS RRs in the range of a few days to one week. This re-signing does not require frequent rollover of the parent's ZSK, but scheduled ZSK rollover should still be performed at regular intervals.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000214-DNS-000079, SRG-APP-000516-DNS-000078
To prevent the impact of a compromised KSK, a delegating parent should set the signature validity period for RRSIGs covering DS RRs in the range of a few days to one week. This re-signing does not require frequent rollover of the parent's ZSK, but scheduled ZSK rollover should still be performed at regular intervals.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000214-DNS-000079, SRG-APP-000516-DNS-000078
V-285247
medium
A mechanism to detect and prevent unauthorized communication flow must be configured or provided as part of the system design. If information flow is not enforced based on approved authorizations, the system may become compromised. Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to travel within a system and between interconnected systems. The flow of all application information must be monitored and controlled so it does not introduce any unacceptable risk to the systems or data.
Application-specific examples of enforcement occurs in systems that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict information system services or provide a message filtering capability based on message content (e.g., implementing key word searches or using document characteristics).
Applications providing information flow control must be able to enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information between interconnected systems in accordance with applicable policy.
Within the context of DNS, this is applicable in terms of controlling the flow of DNS information between systems, such as DNS zone transfers.
Application-specific examples of enforcement occurs in systems that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict information system services or provide a message filtering capability based on message content (e.g., implementing key word searches or using document characteristics).
Applications providing information flow control must be able to enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information between interconnected systems in accordance with applicable policy.
Within the context of DNS, this is applicable in terms of controlling the flow of DNS information between systems, such as DNS zone transfers.
V-285248
medium
If name server replies are invalid or cannot be validated, many networking functions and communications would be adversely affected. With DNS, the presence of Delegation Signer (DS) records associated with child zones informs clients of the security status of child zones. These records are crucial to the DNSSEC chain of trust model. Each parent domain's DS record is used to verify the DNSKEY record in its subdomain, from the top of the DNS hierarchy down.
A DNS server is an example of an information system providing name/address resolution service. Digital signatures and cryptographic keys are examples of additional artifacts. DNS resource records are examples of authoritative data. Applications other than the DNS to map between host/service names and network addresses must provide other means to ensure the authenticity and integrity of response data.
DNSSEC provides the means to verify integrity assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service. By using the DS resource records in the DNS, the security status of a child domain can be validated. The DS resource record is used to identify the DNSSEC signing key of a delegated zone.
Starting from a trusted name server (such as the root name server) and down to the current source of response through successive verifications of signature of the public key of a child by its parent, the chain of trust is established. The public key of the trusted name servers is called the trust anchor. After authenticating the source, the next process DNSSEC calls for is to authenticate the response. This requires that responses consist of not only the requested RRs but also an authenticator associated with them. In DNSSEC, this authenticator is the digital signature of a Resource Record (RR) Set. The digital signature of an RRSet is encapsulated through a special RRType called RRSIG. The DNS client using the trusted public key of the source (whose trust has just been established) then verifies the digital signature to detect if the response is valid or bogus.
This control enables the DNS to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service. Without indication of the security status of a child domain and enabling verification of a chain of trust, integrity and availability of the DNS infrastructure cannot be ensured.
A DNS server is an example of an information system providing name/address resolution service. Digital signatures and cryptographic keys are examples of additional artifacts. DNS resource records are examples of authoritative data. Applications other than the DNS to map between host/service names and network addresses must provide other means to ensure the authenticity and integrity of response data.
DNSSEC provides the means to verify integrity assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service. By using the DS resource records in the DNS, the security status of a child domain can be validated. The DS resource record is used to identify the DNSSEC signing key of a delegated zone.
Starting from a trusted name server (such as the root name server) and down to the current source of response through successive verifications of signature of the public key of a child by its parent, the chain of trust is established. The public key of the trusted name servers is called the trust anchor. After authenticating the source, the next process DNSSEC calls for is to authenticate the response. This requires that responses consist of not only the requested RRs but also an authenticator associated with them. In DNSSEC, this authenticator is the digital signature of a Resource Record (RR) Set. The digital signature of an RRSet is encapsulated through a special RRType called RRSIG. The DNS client using the trusted public key of the source (whose trust has just been established) then verifies the digital signature to detect if the response is valid or bogus.
This control enables the DNS to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service. Without indication of the security status of a child domain and enabling verification of a chain of trust, integrity and availability of the DNS infrastructure cannot be ensured.
V-285249
medium
DNS is a fundamental network service that is prone to various attacks, such as cache poisoning and man-in-the middle attacks. If communication sessions are not provided appropriate validity protections, such as the employment of DNSSEC, the authenticity of the data cannot be guaranteed.
V-285253
medium
The use of CNAME records for exercises, tests, or zone-spanning aliases should be temporary (e.g., to facilitate a migration). When a host name is an alias for a record in another zone, an adversary has two points of attack: the zone in which the alias is defined and the zone authoritative for the alias's canonical name. This configuration also reduces the speed of client resolution because it requires a second look up after obtaining the canonical name. Furthermore, in the case of an authoritative name server, this information is promulgated throughout the enterprise to caching servers and thus compounds the vulnerability.
V-285254
medium
A DoS is a condition where a resource is not available for legitimate users. When this occurs, the organization either cannot accomplish its mission or must operate at degraded capacity. Individuals of concern can include hostile insiders or external adversaries that have successfully breached the information system and are using the system as a platform to launch cyberattacks on third parties.
Applications and application developers must take the steps needed to ensure users cannot use an authorized application to launch DoS attacks against other systems and networks. For example, applications may include mechanisms that throttle network traffic so users are not able to generate unlimited network traffic via the application. Limiting system resources that are allocated to any user to a bare minimum may also reduce the ability of users to launch some DoS attacks.
When it comes to DoS attacks, most of the attention is paid to ensuring that systems and applications are not victims of these attacks. A DoS attack against the DNS infrastructure has the potential to cause a DoS to all network users. As the DNS is a distributed backbone service of the internet, numerous forms of attacks result in DoS. Some potential DoS attacks against the DNS include malformed packet flood, spoofed source addresses, and distributed DoS, and the DNS can be exploited to launch amplification attacks upon other systems.
While it is true that those accountable for systems want to ensure they are not affected by a DoS attack, they also need to ensure their systems and applications are not used to launch such an attack against others. To that end, a variety of technologies exist to limit the effects of DoS attacks, such as careful configuration of resolver and recursion functionality.
DNS administrators must take the steps needed to ensure other systems and tools cannot use exploits to launch DoS attacks against other systems and networks. An example would be designing the DNS architecture to include mechanisms that throttle DNS traffic and resources so that users/other DNS servers are not able to generate unlimited DNS traffic via the application.
Applications and application developers must take the steps needed to ensure users cannot use an authorized application to launch DoS attacks against other systems and networks. For example, applications may include mechanisms that throttle network traffic so users are not able to generate unlimited network traffic via the application. Limiting system resources that are allocated to any user to a bare minimum may also reduce the ability of users to launch some DoS attacks.
When it comes to DoS attacks, most of the attention is paid to ensuring that systems and applications are not victims of these attacks. A DoS attack against the DNS infrastructure has the potential to cause a DoS to all network users. As the DNS is a distributed backbone service of the internet, numerous forms of attacks result in DoS. Some potential DoS attacks against the DNS include malformed packet flood, spoofed source addresses, and distributed DoS, and the DNS can be exploited to launch amplification attacks upon other systems.
While it is true that those accountable for systems want to ensure they are not affected by a DoS attack, they also need to ensure their systems and applications are not used to launch such an attack against others. To that end, a variety of technologies exist to limit the effects of DoS attacks, such as careful configuration of resolver and recursion functionality.
DNS administrators must take the steps needed to ensure other systems and tools cannot use exploits to launch DoS attacks against other systems and networks. An example would be designing the DNS architecture to include mechanisms that throttle DNS traffic and resources so that users/other DNS servers are not able to generate unlimited DNS traffic via the application.
V-285255
medium
A DoS is a condition when a resource is not available for legitimate users. When this occurs, the organization either cannot accomplish its mission or must operate at degraded capacity.
In the case of application DoS attacks, care must be taken when designing the application to ensure the application makes the best use of system resources. SQL queries have the potential to consume large amounts of CPU cycles if they are not tuned for optimal performance. Web services containing complex calculations requiring large amounts of time to complete can bog down if too many requests for the service are encountered within a short period of time.
A DoS attack against the DNS infrastructure has the potential to cause a DoS to all network users. As the DNS is a distributed backbone service of the internet, various forms of amplification attacks resulting in DoS, while utilizing the DNS, are still prevalent on the internet today. Some potential DoS flooding attacks against the DNS include malformed packet flood, spoofed source addresses, and distributed DoS. Without the DNS, users and systems would not have the ability to perform simple name to IP resolution.
Configuring the DNS implementation to defend against cache poisoning, employing increased capacity and bandwidth, building redundancy into the DNS architecture, utilizing DNSSEC, limiting and securing recursive services, DNS black holes, etc., may reduce the susceptibility to some flooding types of DoS attacks.
In the case of application DoS attacks, care must be taken when designing the application to ensure the application makes the best use of system resources. SQL queries have the potential to consume large amounts of CPU cycles if they are not tuned for optimal performance. Web services containing complex calculations requiring large amounts of time to complete can bog down if too many requests for the service are encountered within a short period of time.
A DoS attack against the DNS infrastructure has the potential to cause a DoS to all network users. As the DNS is a distributed backbone service of the internet, various forms of amplification attacks resulting in DoS, while utilizing the DNS, are still prevalent on the internet today. Some potential DoS flooding attacks against the DNS include malformed packet flood, spoofed source addresses, and distributed DoS. Without the DNS, users and systems would not have the ability to perform simple name to IP resolution.
Configuring the DNS implementation to defend against cache poisoning, employing increased capacity and bandwidth, building redundancy into the DNS architecture, utilizing DNSSEC, limiting and securing recursive services, DNS black holes, etc., may reduce the susceptibility to some flooding types of DoS attacks.
V-285259
high
The major threat associated with DNS forged responses or failures is the integrity of the DNS data returned in the response. The principle of DNSSEC is to mitigate this threat by providing data origin authentication, establishing trust in the source. This requirement enables remote clients to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service.
A DNS server is an example of an information system providing name/address resolution service. Digital signatures and cryptographic keys are examples of additional artifacts. DNS resource records are examples of authoritative data. Applications other than the DNS to map between host/service names and network addresses must provide other means to assure the authenticity and integrity of response data.
In the case of DNS, employ DNSSEC to provide an additional data origin and integrity artifacts along with the authoritative data the system returns in response to DNS name/address resolution queries.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000033-DNS-000042, SRG-APP-000213-DNS-000053, SRG-APP-000215-DNS-000089, SRG-APP-000219-DNS-000030, SRG-APP-000421-DNS-000054, SRG-APP-000422-DNS-000055, SRG-APP-000423-DNS-000056, SRG-APP-000424-DNS-000057, SRG-APP-000425-DNS-000058, SRG-APP-000426-DNS-000059, SRG-APP-000439-DNS-000063, SRG-APP-000440-DNS-000065, SRG-APP-000900-DNS-000041
A DNS server is an example of an information system providing name/address resolution service. Digital signatures and cryptographic keys are examples of additional artifacts. DNS resource records are examples of authoritative data. Applications other than the DNS to map between host/service names and network addresses must provide other means to assure the authenticity and integrity of response data.
In the case of DNS, employ DNSSEC to provide an additional data origin and integrity artifacts along with the authoritative data the system returns in response to DNS name/address resolution queries.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000033-DNS-000042, SRG-APP-000213-DNS-000053, SRG-APP-000215-DNS-000089, SRG-APP-000219-DNS-000030, SRG-APP-000421-DNS-000054, SRG-APP-000422-DNS-000055, SRG-APP-000423-DNS-000056, SRG-APP-000424-DNS-000057, SRG-APP-000425-DNS-000058, SRG-APP-000426-DNS-000059, SRG-APP-000439-DNS-000063, SRG-APP-000440-DNS-000065, SRG-APP-000900-DNS-000041
V-285260
medium
Untrusted Certificate Authorities (CA) can issue certificates, but they may be issued by organizations or individuals that seek to compromise DoW systems or by organizations with insufficient security controls. If the CA used for verifying the certificate is not a DoW-approved CA, trust of this CA has not been established.
The DoW will only accept PKI certificates obtained from a DoW-approved internal or external certificate authority. Reliance on CAs for the establishment of secure sessions includes, for example, the use of SSL/TLS certificates.
SIG(0) relies on PKI-based authentication, so if SIG(0) is being used, this requirement is applicable.
The DoW will only accept PKI certificates obtained from a DoW-approved internal or external certificate authority. Reliance on CAs for the establishment of secure sessions includes, for example, the use of SSL/TLS certificates.
SIG(0) relies on PKI-based authentication, so if SIG(0) is being used, this requirement is applicable.
V-285263
medium
In addition to network-based dispersion, authoritative name servers should also be dispersed geographically. In other words, in addition to being located on different network segments, the authoritative name servers should not all be located within the same building. One approach that some organizations follow is to locate some authoritative name servers in their own premises and others in their ISPs' data centers or in partnering organizations.
A network administrator may choose to use a "hidden" master authoritative server and only have secondary servers visible on the network. A hidden master authoritative server is an authoritative DNS server whose IP address does not appear in the name server set for a zone. If the master authoritative name server is "hidden", a secondary authoritative name server may reside in the same building as the hidden master.
A network administrator may choose to use a "hidden" master authoritative server and only have secondary servers visible on the network. A hidden master authoritative server is an authoritative DNS server whose IP address does not appear in the name server set for a zone. If the master authoritative name server is "hidden", a secondary authoritative name server may reside in the same building as the hidden master.
V-285264
medium
A potential vulnerability of DNS is that an attacker can poison a name server's cache by sending queries that will cause the server to obtain host-to-IP address mappings from bogus name servers that respond with incorrect information. Once a name server has been poisoned, legitimate clients may be directed to nonexistent hosts (which constitutes a denial of service), or, worse, hosts that masquerade as legitimate ones to obtain sensitive data or passwords.
To guard against poisoning, name servers authoritative for .mil domains should be separated functionally from name servers that resolve queries on behalf of internal clients. Organizations may achieve this separation by dedicating machines to each function or, if possible, by running two instances of the name server software on the same machine: one for the authoritative function and the other for the resolving function. In this design, each name server process may be bound to a different IP address or network interface to implement the required segregation.
DNSSEC ensures that the answer received when querying for name resolution actually comes from a trusted name server. Since DNSSEC is still far from being globally deployed external to DoW, and many resolvers either haven't been updated or do not support DNSSEC, maintaining cached zone data separate from authoritative zone data mitigates the gap until all DNS data is validated with DNSSEC.
Since DNS forwarding of queries can be accomplished in some DNS applications without caching locally, DNS forwarding is the method to be used when providing external DNS resolution to internal clients.
To guard against poisoning, name servers authoritative for .mil domains should be separated functionally from name servers that resolve queries on behalf of internal clients. Organizations may achieve this separation by dedicating machines to each function or, if possible, by running two instances of the name server software on the same machine: one for the authoritative function and the other for the resolving function. In this design, each name server process may be bound to a different IP address or network interface to implement the required segregation.
DNSSEC ensures that the answer received when querying for name resolution actually comes from a trusted name server. Since DNSSEC is still far from being globally deployed external to DoW, and many resolvers either haven't been updated or do not support DNSSEC, maintaining cached zone data separate from authoritative zone data mitigates the gap until all DNS data is validated with DNSSEC.
Since DNS forwarding of queries can be accomplished in some DNS applications without caching locally, DNS forwarding is the method to be used when providing external DNS resolution to internal clients.
V-285265
medium
To ensure that RRs associated with a query are really missing in a zone file and have not been removed in transit, the DNSSEC mechanism provides a means for authenticating the nonexistence of an RR. It generates a special RR called an NSEC (or NSEC3) RR that lists the RRTypes associated with an owner name as well as the next name in the zone file. It sends this special RR, along with its signatures, to the resolving name server. By verifying the signature, a DNSSEC-aware resolving name server can determine which authoritative owner name exists in a zone and which authoritative RRTypes exist at those owner names.
IETF's design criteria consider DNS data to be public. Confidentiality is not one of the security goals of DNSSEC. DNSSEC is not designed to directly protect against denial-of-service threats but does so indirectly by providing message integrity and source authentication. An artifact of how DNSSEC performs negative responses allows a client to map all the names in a zone (zone walking).
A zone that contains zone data the administrator does not want to be made public should use the NSEC3 RR option for providing authenticated denial of existence.
If DNSSEC is enabled for a server, the ability to verify a particular server that may attempt to update the DNS server actually exists. This is done through the use of NSEC3 records to provide an "authenticated denial of existence" for specific systems whose addresses indicate that they lie within a particular zone.
IETF's design criteria consider DNS data to be public. Confidentiality is not one of the security goals of DNSSEC. DNSSEC is not designed to directly protect against denial-of-service threats but does so indirectly by providing message integrity and source authentication. An artifact of how DNSSEC performs negative responses allows a client to map all the names in a zone (zone walking).
A zone that contains zone data the administrator does not want to be made public should use the NSEC3 RR option for providing authenticated denial of existence.
If DNSSEC is enabled for a server, the ability to verify a particular server that may attempt to update the DNS server actually exists. This is done through the use of NSEC3 records to provide an "authenticated denial of existence" for specific systems whose addresses indicate that they lie within a particular zone.
V-285266
medium
Most enterprises have an authoritative primary server and a host of authoritative secondary name servers. It is essential that these authoritative name servers for an enterprise be located on different network segments. This dispersion ensures the availability of an authoritative name server not only in situations in which a particular router or switch fails, but also during events involving an attack on an entire network segment.
A network administrator may choose to use a "hidden" master authoritative server and only have secondary servers visible on the network. A hidden master authoritative server is an authoritative DNS server whose IP address does not appear in the name server set for a zone. If the master authoritative name server is "hidden", a secondary authoritative name server may reside on the same network as the hidden master.
A network administrator may choose to use a "hidden" master authoritative server and only have secondary servers visible on the network. A hidden master authoritative server is an authoritative DNS server whose IP address does not appear in the name server set for a zone. If the master authoritative name server is "hidden", a secondary authoritative name server may reside on the same network as the hidden master.
V-285267
medium
Information can be either unintentionally or maliciously disclosed or modified during reception, including, for example, during aggregation, at protocol transformation points, and during packing/unpacking. These unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information.
Confidentiality is not an objective of DNS, but integrity is. DNS is responsible for maintaining the integrity of DNS information while it is being received.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000441-DNS-000066, SRG-APP-000442-DNS-000067
Confidentiality is not an objective of DNS, but integrity is. DNS is responsible for maintaining the integrity of DNS information while it is being received.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000441-DNS-000066, SRG-APP-000442-DNS-000067
V-285269
high
Each newer version of the name server software, especially the BIND software, generally is devoid of vulnerabilities found in earlier versions because it has design changes incorporated to address those vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities have been exploited (i.e., some form of attack was launched), and sufficient information has been generated with respect to the nature of those exploits. The latest version of name server software is the safest version. Even if the software is the latest version, it is not safe to run it in default mode. The security administrator should always configure the software to run in the recommended secure mode of operation after becoming familiar with the new security settings for the latest version.
V-285271
medium
Predictable failure prevention requires organizational planning to address system failure issues. If components key to maintaining systems security fail to function, the system could continue operating in an insecure state. The organization must be prepared and the application must support requirements that specify if the application must alarm for such conditions and/or automatically shut down the application or the system.
This can include conducting a graceful application shutdown to avoid losing information. Automatic or manual transfer of components from standby to active mode can occur, for example, upon detection of component failures.
If a component such as the DNSSEC or TSIG/SIG(0) signing capabilities were to fail, the DNS server should shut itself down to prevent continued execution without the necessary security components in place. Transactions such as zone transfers would not be able to work correctly in this state.
This can include conducting a graceful application shutdown to avoid losing information. Automatic or manual transfer of components from standby to active mode can occur, for example, upon detection of component failures.
If a component such as the DNSSEC or TSIG/SIG(0) signing capabilities were to fail, the DNS server should shut itself down to prevent continued execution without the necessary security components in place. Transactions such as zone transfers would not be able to work correctly in this state.
V-285272
medium
Failing to act on the validation errors may result in the use of invalid, corrupted, or compromised information. The validation of bindings can be achieved, for example, by the use of cryptographic checksums. Validations must be performed automatically.
At a minimum, the application must log the validation error. However, more stringent actions can be taken based on the security posture and value of the information. The organization should consider the system's environment and impact of the errors when defining the actions. Additional examples of actions include automated notification to administrators, halting system process, or halting the specific operation.
The DNS server should audit all failed attempts at server authentication through DNSSEC and TSIG/SIG(0). The actual auditing is performed by the OS/NDM but the configuration to trigger the auditing is controlled by the DNS server.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000474-DNS-000044, SRG-APP-000474-DNS-000073, SRG-APP-000504-DNS-000074, SRG-APP-000504-DNS-000082
At a minimum, the application must log the validation error. However, more stringent actions can be taken based on the security posture and value of the information. The organization should consider the system's environment and impact of the errors when defining the actions. Additional examples of actions include automated notification to administrators, halting system process, or halting the specific operation.
The DNS server should audit all failed attempts at server authentication through DNSSEC and TSIG/SIG(0). The actual auditing is performed by the OS/NDM but the configuration to trigger the auditing is controlled by the DNS server.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000474-DNS-000044, SRG-APP-000474-DNS-000073, SRG-APP-000504-DNS-000074, SRG-APP-000504-DNS-000082
V-285273
medium
Failing to an unsecure condition negatively impacts application security and can lead to system compromise. Failure conditions include, for example, loss of communications among critical system components or between system components and operational facilities. Fail-safe procedures include, for example, alerting operator personnel and providing specific instructions on subsequent steps to take (e.g., do nothing, reestablish system settings, shut down processes, restart the system, or contact designated organizational personnel).
If a component such as the DNSSEC or TSIG/SIG(0) signing capabilities were to fail, the DNS server should shut itself down to prevent continued execution without the necessary security components in place. Transactions such as zone transfers would not be able to work correctly anyway in this state.
If a component such as the DNSSEC or TSIG/SIG(0) signing capabilities were to fail, the DNS server should shut itself down to prevent continued execution without the necessary security components in place. Transactions such as zone transfers would not be able to work correctly anyway in this state.
V-285274
high
Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data. The application must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher standards approved by the federal government since this provides assurance they have been tested and validated.
V-285276
medium
Poorly constructed NS records pose a security risk because they create conditions under which an adversary might be able to provide the missing authoritative name services that are improperly specified in the zone file. The adversary could issue bogus responses to queries that clients would accept because they learned of the adversary's name server from a valid authoritative name server, one that need not be compromised for this attack to be successful. The list of slave servers must remain current within 72 hours of any changes to the zone architecture that would affect the list of slaves. If a slave server has been retired or is not operational but remains on the list, then an adversary might have a greater opportunity to impersonate that slave without detection, rather than if the slave were actually online. For example, the adversary may be able to spoof the retired slave's IP address without an IP address conflict, which would not be likely to occur if the true slave were active.
V-285278
medium
The only protection approach for content control of DNS zone files is the use of a zone file integrity checker. The effectiveness of integrity checking using a zone file integrity checker depends upon the database of constraints built into the checker. The deployment process consists of developing these constraints with the right logic, and the only determinant of the truth value of these logical predicates is the parameter values for certain key fields in the format of various RRTypes.
The serial number in the SOA RDATA is used to indicate to secondary name servers that a change to the zone has occurred and a zone transfer should be performed. It should always be increased whenever a change is made to the zone data. DNS NOTIFY must be enabled on the master authoritative name server.
The serial number in the SOA RDATA is used to indicate to secondary name servers that a change to the zone has occurred and a zone transfer should be performed. It should always be increased whenever a change is made to the zone data. DNS NOTIFY must be enabled on the master authoritative name server.
V-285279
high
The choice of digital signature algorithm will be based on recommended algorithms in well-known standards. NIST's Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [FIPS186] provides three algorithm choices:
- Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).
- RSA.
- Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA).
Of these three algorithms, RSA and DSA are more widely available and hence are considered candidates of choice for DNSSEC. In terms of performance, both RSA and DSA have comparable signature generation speeds, but DSA is much slower for signature verification. Hence, RSA is the recommended algorithm as far as this guideline is concerned. RSA with SHA-1 is currently the only cryptographic algorithm mandated to be implemented with DNSSEC, although other algorithm suites (i.e., RSA/SHA-256, ECDSA) are also specified. It can be expected that name servers and clients will be able to use the RSA algorithm at the minimum. It is suggested that at least one ZSK for a zone use the RSA algorithm.
NIST's Secure Hash Standard (SHS) (FIPS 180-3) specifies SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as approved hash algorithms to be used as part of the algorithm suite for generating digital signatures using the digital signature algorithms in NIST's DSS[FIPS186]. It is expected that there will be support for Elliptic Curve Cryptography in the DNSSEC. The migration path for USG DNSSEC operation will be to ECDSA (or similar) from RSA/SHA-1 and RSA/SHA-256 before September 30th, 2015.
- Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).
- RSA.
- Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA).
Of these three algorithms, RSA and DSA are more widely available and hence are considered candidates of choice for DNSSEC. In terms of performance, both RSA and DSA have comparable signature generation speeds, but DSA is much slower for signature verification. Hence, RSA is the recommended algorithm as far as this guideline is concerned. RSA with SHA-1 is currently the only cryptographic algorithm mandated to be implemented with DNSSEC, although other algorithm suites (i.e., RSA/SHA-256, ECDSA) are also specified. It can be expected that name servers and clients will be able to use the RSA algorithm at the minimum. It is suggested that at least one ZSK for a zone use the RSA algorithm.
NIST's Secure Hash Standard (SHS) (FIPS 180-3) specifies SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as approved hash algorithms to be used as part of the algorithm suite for generating digital signatures using the digital signature algorithms in NIST's DSS[FIPS186]. It is expected that there will be support for Elliptic Curve Cryptography in the DNSSEC. The migration path for USG DNSSEC operation will be to ECDSA (or similar) from RSA/SHA-1 and RSA/SHA-256 before September 30th, 2015.
V-285280
medium
Authoritative name servers for an enterprise may be configured to receive requests from both external and internal clients.
External clients must receive RRs that pertain only to public services (public web server, mail server, etc.).
Internal clients must receive RRs pertaining to public services as well as internal hosts.
The zone information that serves the RRs on both the inside and the outside of a firewall should be split into different physical files for these two types of clients (one file for external clients and one file for internal clients).
External clients must receive RRs that pertain only to public services (public web server, mail server, etc.).
Internal clients must receive RRs pertaining to public services as well as internal hosts.
The zone information that serves the RRs on both the inside and the outside of a firewall should be split into different physical files for these two types of clients (one file for external clients and one file for internal clients).
V-285281
medium
Instead of having the same set of authoritative name servers serve different types of clients, an enterprise could have two different sets of authoritative name servers.
One set, called external name servers, can be located within a DMZ; these would be the only name servers that are accessible to external clients and would serve RRs pertaining to hosts with public services (web servers that serve external web pages or provide B2C services, mail servers, etc.).
The other set, called internal name servers, is to be located within the firewall and should be configured so they are not reachable from outside and hence provide naming services exclusively to internal clients.
One set, called external name servers, can be located within a DMZ; these would be the only name servers that are accessible to external clients and would serve RRs pertaining to hosts with public services (web servers that serve external web pages or provide B2C services, mail servers, etc.).
The other set, called internal name servers, is to be located within the firewall and should be configured so they are not reachable from outside and hence provide naming services exclusively to internal clients.
V-285282
medium
Instead of having the same set of authoritative name servers serve different types of clients, an enterprise could have two different sets of authoritative name servers.
One set, called external name servers, can be located within a DMZ; these would be the only name servers accessible to external clients and would serve RRs pertaining to hosts with public services (Web servers that serve external Web pages or provide B2C services, mail servers, etc.).
The other set, called internal name servers, must be located within the firewall and configured to not be reachable from outside; hence, providing naming services exclusively to internal clients.
One set, called external name servers, can be located within a DMZ; these would be the only name servers accessible to external clients and would serve RRs pertaining to hosts with public services (Web servers that serve external Web pages or provide B2C services, mail servers, etc.).
The other set, called internal name servers, must be located within the firewall and configured to not be reachable from outside; hence, providing naming services exclusively to internal clients.
V-285283
medium
Authoritative name servers (especially primary name servers) should be configured with an allow-transfer access control substatement designating the list of hosts from which zone transfer requests can be accepted. These restrictions address the denial-of-service threat and potential exploits from unrestricted dissemination of information about internal resources. Based on the need-to-know, the only name servers that need to refresh their zone files periodically are the secondary name servers. Zone transfer from primary name servers should be restricted to secondary name servers. The zone transfer should be completely disabled in the secondary name servers. The address match list argument for the allow-transfer substatement should consist of IP addresses of secondary name servers and stealth secondary name servers.
V-285284
medium
DNS servers with an internal role only process name/address resolution requests from within the organization (i.e., internal clients). DNS servers with an external role only process name/address resolution information requests from clients external to the organization (i.e., on the external networks, including the internet). The set of clients that can access an authoritative DNS server in a particular role is specified by the organization using address ranges, explicit access control lists, etc. To protect internal DNS resource information, it is important to isolate the requests to internal DNS servers. Separating internal and external roles in DNS prevents address space that is private (e.g., 10.0.0.0/24) or is otherwise concealed by some form of Network Address Translation from leaking into the public DNS system.
V-285285
medium
All caching name servers must be authoritative for the root zone because, without this starting point, they would have no knowledge of the DNS infrastructure and thus would be unable to respond to any queries. The security risk is that an adversary could change the root hints and direct the caching name server to a bogus root server. At that point, every query response from that name server is suspect, which would give the adversary substantial control over the network communication of the name servers' clients. When authoritative servers are sent queries for zones that they are not authoritative for, and they are configured as a noncaching server (as recommended), they can either be configured to return a referral to the root servers or they can be configured to refuse to answer the query. The recommendation is to configure authoritative servers to refuse to answer queries for any zones for which they are not authoritative. This is more efficient for the server and allows it to spend more of its resources doing what its intended purpose is, answering authoritatively for its zone.
V-285286
medium
OS configuration practices as issued by the United States Computer Emergency Response Team (US CERT) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) National Vulnerability Database (NVD), based on identified vulnerabilities that pertain to the application profile into which the name server software fits, should be always followed. In particular, hosts that run the name server software should not provide any other services and therefore, should be configured to respond to DNS traffic only. The only allowed incoming ports/protocols to these hosts should be 53/udp and 53/tcp.
Outgoing DNS messages should be sent from a random port to minimize the risk of an attacker guessing the outgoing message port and sending forged replies.
Outgoing DNS messages should be sent from a random port to minimize the risk of an attacker guessing the outgoing message port and sending forged replies.
V-285290
medium
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is based on the premise that individual users are "owners" of objects and therefore, have discretion over who should be authorized to access the object and in which mode (e.g., read or write). Ownership is usually acquired as a consequence of creating the object or via specified ownership assignment. In a DNS implementation, DAC should be granted to a minimal number of individuals and objects because DNS does not interact directly with users and users do not store and share data with the DNS application directly.
The primary objective of DNS authentication and access control is the integrity of DNS records; only authorized personnel must be able to create and modify resource records, and name servers should only accept updates from authoritative master servers for the relevant zones. Integrity is best ensured through authentication and access control features within the name server software and the file system on which the name server resides. To protect the zone files and configuration data, which should only be accessed by the name service or an administrator, access controls must be implemented on files, and rights should not be easily propagated to other users. Lack of a stringent access control policy places the DNS infrastructure at risk to malicious persons and attackers, in addition to potential denial of service to network resources.
DAC allows the owner to determine who will have access to objects they control. An example of DAC includes user-controlled file permissions. DAC models have the potential for the access controls to propagate without limit, resulting in unauthorized access to said objects.
When applications provide a DAC mechanism, the DNS implementation must be able to limit the propagation of those access rights.
The primary objective of DNS authentication and access control is the integrity of DNS records; only authorized personnel must be able to create and modify resource records, and name servers should only accept updates from authoritative master servers for the relevant zones. Integrity is best ensured through authentication and access control features within the name server software and the file system on which the name server resides. To protect the zone files and configuration data, which should only be accessed by the name service or an administrator, access controls must be implemented on files, and rights should not be easily propagated to other users. Lack of a stringent access control policy places the DNS infrastructure at risk to malicious persons and attackers, in addition to potential denial of service to network resources.
DAC allows the owner to determine who will have access to objects they control. An example of DAC includes user-controlled file permissions. DAC models have the potential for the access controls to propagate without limit, resulting in unauthorized access to said objects.
When applications provide a DAC mechanism, the DNS implementation must be able to limit the propagation of those access rights.
V-285296
medium
The purpose of requiring a device that is separate from the system to which the user is attempting to gain access for one of the factors during multifactor authentication is to reduce the likelihood of compromising authenticators or credentials stored on the system. Adversaries may be able to compromise such authenticators or credentials and subsequently impersonate authorized users. Implementing one of the factors on a separate device (e.g., a hardware token), provides a greater strength of mechanism and an increased level of assurance in the authentication process.
V-285297
medium
The purpose of requiring a device that is separate from the system to which the user is attempting to gain access for one of the factors during multifactor authentication is to reduce the likelihood of compromising authenticators or credentials stored on the system. Adversaries may be able to compromise such authenticators or credentials and subsequently impersonate authorized users. Implementing one of the factors on a separate device (e.g., a hardware token), provides a greater strength of mechanism and an increased level of assurance in the authentication process.
V-285303
medium
Password-based authentication applies to passwords regardless of whether they are used in single-factor or multifactor authentication. Long passwords or passphrases are preferable over shorter passwords. Enforced composition rules provide marginal security benefits while decreasing usability. However, organizations may choose to establish certain rules for password generation (e.g., minimum character length for long passwords) under certain circumstances and can enforce this requirement in IA-5(1)(h). Account recovery can occur, for example, in situations when a password is forgotten. Cryptographically protected passwords include salted one-way cryptographic hashes of passwords. The list of commonly used, compromised, or expected passwords includes passwords obtained from previous breach corpuses, dictionary words, and repetitive or sequential characters. The list includes context-specific words, such as the name of the service, username, and derivatives thereof.
V-285304
medium
Password-based authentication applies to passwords regardless of whether they are used in single-factor or multifactor authentication. Long passwords or passphrases are preferable over shorter passwords. Enforced composition rules provide marginal security benefits while decreasing usability. However, organizations may choose to establish certain rules for password generation (e.g., minimum character length for long passwords) under certain circumstances and can enforce this requirement in IA-5(1)(h). Account recovery can occur, for example, in situations when a password is forgotten. Cryptographically protected passwords include salted one-way cryptographic hashes of passwords. The list of commonly used, compromised, or expected passwords includes passwords obtained from previous breach corpuses, dictionary words, and repetitive or sequential characters. The list includes context-specific words, such as the name of the service, username, and derivatives thereof.
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000860-DNS-000250, SRG-APP-000865-DNS-000260, SRG-APP-000870-DNS-000270
Satisfies: SRG-APP-000860-DNS-000250, SRG-APP-000865-DNS-000260, SRG-APP-000870-DNS-000270
V-285308
medium
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is an example of a hardware-protected data store that can be used to protect cryptographic keys.
V-285309
medium
Time synchronization of system clocks is essential for the correct execution of many system services, including identification and authentication processes that involve certificates and time-of-day restrictions as part of access control. Denial of service or failure to deny expired credentials may result without properly synchronized clocks within and between systems and system components. Time is commonly expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), a modern continuation of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), or local time with an offset from UTC. The granularity of time measurements refers to the degree of synchronization between system clocks and reference clocks, such as clocks synchronizing within hundreds of milliseconds or tens of milliseconds. Organizations may define different time granularities for system components. Time service can be critical to other security capabilities such as access control and identification and authentications depending on the nature of the mechanisms used to support the capabilities.