What changed in Network WLAN AP-NIPR Platform STIG V7R4V7R4 changes

Discussion

DoDDoW networks are at risk and DoDDoW data could be compromised if wireless scanning is not conducted to identify unauthorized WLAN clients and access points connected to or attempting to connect to the network. DoDDoW Components must ensure that a Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) is implemented that allows for monitoring of WLAN activity and the detection of WLAN-related policy violations on all unclassified and classified DoDDoW wired and wireless LANs. The WIDS must be implemented regardless of whether or not an authorized WLAN has been deployed. The WIDS must be capable of monitoring IEEE 802.11 transmissions within all DoDDoW LAN environments and detecting nearby unauthorized WLAN devices. The WIDS is not required to monitor non-IEEE 802.11 transmissions. The WIDS must continuously scan for and detect authorized and unauthorized WLAN activities 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Note: Exceptions to WIDS implementation criteria may be made by the AO for DoDDoW wired and wireless LAN operating environments. This exception allows the AO to implement periodic scanning conducted by designated personnel using handheld scanners during walk-through assessments. Periodic scanning may be conducted as the alternative to the continuous scanning only in special circumstances, where it has been determined on a case-by-case basis that continuous scanning is either infeasible or unwarranted. The AO exception must be documented. The "infeasible" criteria includes the following use case examples: - It is not my building - This scenario means that for contractual or other similar reasons, the DoDDoW component is not allowed to install a WIDS. - There is no power or space is limited - This scenarios means that for space weight and power (SWAP) reasons, the addition of continuous scanning capabilities cannot be accomplished because it would exceeds SWAP availability. Power would also affect the decision to waive continuous scanning requirements if the entire LAN is only in operation periodically (e.g., the wired/wireless LAN is enabled on a vehicle that is only operating when the vehicle is being used for a specific operation). - The exception for "Minimal Impact WLAN Systems" that do not provide connectivity to WLAN-enabled PEDs (e.g., backhaul systems), have no available FIPS 140 -validated 802.1X EAP-TLS supplicant, support a very small number of users for a specific mission (e.g., 10 or less users), are standalone networks, or are highly specialized WLAN systems that are isolated from the DODINDOWIN (e.g., handheld personal digital assistants [PDAs] used as radio-frequency identification [RFID] readers, a network of WLAN-enabled Voice over Internet Protocol [VoIP] phones) allows the AO to waive any of the security requirements in the Instruction. This includes using non-standard/proprietary FIPS-validated encryption, using an alternative FIPS-validated EAP type, and not having a continuous WIDS. - The cost of the continuous WIDS capability is more expensive that the total cost of the LAN without a WIDS. The AO must conduct a wireless threat risk assessment where analysis has shown that the threat environment is extremely unlikely to non-existentnonexistent to meet the "unwarranted" exception criteria.

V-243216 in V7R4

Title

WLAN components must be Wi-Fi Alliance certified with WPA2 or WPA3.

Check text

Review the WLAN equipment specification and verify it is Wi-Fi Alliance certified with either the older WPA2 certification or the newer WPA3 certification. WPA3 is preferred but not required at this time. If the WLAN equipment is not Wi-Fi Alliance certified with WPA2 or WPA3, this is a finding.

Fix text

Use WLAN equipment that is Wi-Fi Alliance certified with WPA2 or WPA3.

Discussion

Wi-Fi Alliance certification ensures compliance with DoDW interoperability requirements between various WLAN products.

V-243219 in V7R4

Check text

Note: If the equipment is WPA2/WPA3 certified by the Wi-Fi Alliance, it is capable of supporting this requirement. Review the WLAN equipment configuration to verify that EAP-TLS is actively used and no other methods are enabled. If EAP-TLS is not used or if the WLAN system allows users to connect with other methods, this is a finding.

Discussion

EAP-TLS provides strong cryptographic mutual authentication and key distribution services not found in other EAP methods, and thus provides significantly more protection against attacks than other methods. Additionally, EAP-TLS supports two-factor user authentication on the WLAN client, which provides significantly more protection than methods that rely on a password or certificate alone. EAP-TLS also can leverage the DoDDoW Commoncommon Accessaccess Cardcard (CAC) in its authentication services, providing additional security and convenience.

V-243220 in V7R4

Discussion

If the DoDDoW WLAN components (WLAN AP, controller, or client) are not NIST FIPS 140-2/FIPS 140-3 (Cryptographic Module Validation Program, CMVP) certified, the WLAN system may not adequately protect sensitive unclassified DoDDoW data from compromise during transmission.

V-243221 in V7R4

Title

WLAN EAP-TLS implementation must use certificate-based PKI authentication to connect to DoDW networks.

Check text

Interview the site ISSO and SA. Determine if the site's network is configured to require certificate-based PKI authentication before a WLAN user is connected to the network. If certificate-based PKI authentication is not required prior to a DoDDoW WLAN user accessing the DoDDoW network, this is a finding. Note: This check does not apply to medical devices. Medical devices are permitted to connect to the WLAN using pre-shared keys.

Discussion

DoDDoW certificate-based PKI authentication is strong, two-factor authentication that relies on carefully evaluated cryptographic modules. Implementations of EAP-TLS that are not integrated with certificate-based PKI could have security vulnerabilities. For example, an implementation that uses a client certificate on laptop without a second factor could enable an adversary with access to the laptop to connect to the WLAN without a PIN or password. Systems that do not use the certificate-based PKI are also much more likely to be vulnerable to weaknesses in the underlying public key infrastructure (PKI) that supports EAP-TLS. Certificate-based PKI authentication must be used to connect WLAN client devices to DoDDoW networks. The certificate-based PKI authentication should directly support the WLAN EAP-TLS implementation. At least one layer of user authentication must enforce network authentication requirements (e.g., CAC authentication) before the user is able to access DoDDoW information resources.

V-243222 in V7R4

Discussion

Most commercially available WLAN equipment is preconfigured for signal power appropriate to most applications of the WLAN equipment. In some cases, this may permit the signals to be received outside the physical areas for which they are intended. This can occur when the intended area is relatively small, such as a conference room, or when the access point is placed near or window or wall, thereby allowing signals to be received in neighboring areas. In such cases, an adversary may be able to compromise the site's posture by measuring the presence of the signal and the quantity of data transmitted to obtain information about when personnel are active and what they are doing. If the signal is not appropriately protected through defense-in-depth mechanisms, the adversary could possibly use the connection to access DoDDoW networks and sensitive information.

V-243223 in V7R4