V2R7 changes
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.x STIG V2R7 (2026-09-30) replaced V2R6 (2026-07-01): 5 checks updated. It has 83 checks, against 83 in V2R6.
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- 0 added
- 0 removed
- 5 updated
Updated fields: Check text 2Fix text 2Title 2Discussion 2
Updated in V2R7 (5)
V-257516CAT IIIOpenShift must display the Standard Mandatory DoW Notice and Consent Banner before granting access to platform components.Title, Check text, Fix text, Discussion
Title
OpenShift must display the Standard Mandatory DODoW Notice and Consent Banner before granting access to platform components.
Check text
To verify the OpenShift CLI tool is configured to display the DODDoW Notice and Consent Banner, do either of the following steps:
Log in to OpenShift using the oc CLI tool.
oc login -u <USER> <OPENSHIFT_URL>
enter password when prompted
If the DODDoW Notice and Consent Banner is not displayed, this is a finding.
Or
Verify that motd config map exists and contains the DODDoW Notice and Consent Banner by executing the following:
oc describe configmap/motd -n openshift
If the configmap does not exist, or it does not contain the DODDoW Notice and Consent Banner text in the message data attribute, this is a finding.
Fix text
The following command will create a configmap that displays the DODDoW Notice and Consent Banner when logging in using the OpenShift CLI tool by executing the following:
echo 'apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: motd
namespace: openshift
data:
message: "You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only. By using this IS (which includes any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions:1n1n-The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations.1n1n-At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS.1n1n-Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose.1n1n-This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access controls) to protect USG interests--not for your personal benefit or privacy.1n1n-Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of privileged communications, or work product, related to personal representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and confidential. See User Agreement for details."' | oc apply -f -
Discussion
OpenShift has countless components where different access levels are needed. To control access, the user must first log into the component and then be presented with a DODDoW-approved use notification banner before granting access to the component. This guarantees privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.
V-257517CAT IIOpenShift must generate audit records for all DoW-defined auditable events within all components in the platform.Title
Title
OpenShift must generate audit records for all DODoW-defined auditable events within all components in the platform.
V-257542CAT IIOpenShift must use FIPS-validated SHA-1 or higher hash function to provide replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for network access to privileged accounts.Discussion
Discussion
A replay attack may enable an unauthorized user to gain access to the application. Authentication sessions between the authenticator and the application validating the user credentials must not be vulnerable to a replay attack.
Anti-replay is a cryptographically based mechanism; thus, it must use FIPS-approved algorithms. An authentication process resists replay attacks if it is impractical to achieve a successful authentication by recording and replaying a previous authentication message. Note that the anti-replay service is implicit when data contains monotonically increasing sequence numbers and data integrity is assured. Use of DODDoW PKI is inherently compliant with this requirement for user and device access. Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS), including application protocols such as HTTPS and DNSSEC, that use TLS/SSL as the underlying security protocol is also complaint.
Configure the information system to use the hash message authentication code (HMAC) algorithm for authentication services to Kerberos, SSH, web management tool, and any other access method.
V-257564CAT IIOpenShift keystore must implement encryption to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information at rest within the container platform.Fix text
Fix text
Set API encryption type by executing the following:
oc edit apiserver
Set the encryption field type to aescbc:
spec:
encryption:
type: aescbc
Additional details about the configuration can be found in the OpenShift documentation:
https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.8/security/encrypting-etcd.html
V-257580CAT IIRed Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS (RHCOS) must be configured to audit the loading and unloading of dynamic kernel modules.Check text
Check text
Verify the audit rules capture loading and unloading of kernel modules by executing the following:
for node in $(oc get node -oname); do oc debug $node -- chroot /host /bin/bash -c 'echo -n "$HOSTNAME "; grep -e module-load -e module-unload -e module-change /etc/audit/rules.d/* /etc/audit/audit.rules' 2>/dev/null; done
Confirm the following rules exist on each node.
-a always,exit -F arch=b32b64 -S init_module,finit_moduledelete_module -F key=module-loadunload
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S delete_moduleinit_module,finit_module -F key=module-unloadload
-a always,exit -F arch=b64b32 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S delete_module -k module-change
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -k module-change
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S finit_module -k module-change
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S finit_module -k module-change
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S init_module -k module-change
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module -k module-change
If the above rules are not listed for each node, this is a finding.
How these changes are found
Checks are matched across the two releases by V-number. A check counts as updated when DISA gave it a new rule revision (the r number in its SV-…_rule id) and its title, severity, check text, fix text, discussion, CCIs or other fields changed — the same comparison STIG Compare makes. Added checks are new V-numbers; removed checks are V-numbers V2R7 no longer has.
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