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Assessment Title
Rule Text
The implementation of VoIP systems in the local enclave must not degrade the enclaves perimeter protection due to inadequate design of the VoIP boundary and its connection to external networks.
Description
Discussion Text
VoIP has the potential to significantly degrade the enclave boundary protection afforded by the required boundary firewall unless the firewall is designed to properly handle VoIP traffic. The typical firewall used to protect an enclave supporting data traffic is not capable of properly handling or supporting real-time communications (VoIP and video conferencing).
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and related protocols used for call establishment and control rely on dedicated TCP ports that must be open inbound at all times to receive calls. Real-time Transfer Protocol (RTP) and Real-time Transfer Control Protocol (RTCP) use randomly assigned UDP ports in the range of 1025-65535 with four IP ports required for every bi-directional voice session. The number of ports is increased when video is added. The method of supporting VoIP through a standard data firewall is to open the signaling TCP ports and a broad range of UDP ports for the RTP/RTCP media streams. A data firewall does provide limited protection for VoIP implementations when inbound permit statements are restricted to specific address ranges. This is not possible if calls are to be permitted from any IP address on the Internet or NIPRNet.
VoIP stateful firewalls and session border controllers, in parallel with the data firewall, provide the best protection for the enclave. Dynamically opening required UDP ports to permit the flow of the media, performing stateful inspection of UDP media packets and dropping all non-session packets, and then closing the UDP ports at the session’s end or after an inactivity timeout greatly increases enclave protection. This configuration provides the capability to decrypt the media streams for inspection and recording. This supports, for CALEA purposes, the monitoring and recording of calls that traverse the enclave boundary.
When a VoIP system is a closed system, such as DISN classified networks, the entire address space of the WAN and connected enclaves is managed by a single system manager. In this instance, a specific limited and segregated address space may be assigned for all VoIP devices in use across the network. The risk to the enclave is limited when a standard firewall is used with inbound permit statements that are based on the segregated IP address range.
Furthermore, when NAT is used, the VoIP stateful firewall or session border controller provide RFC 1918 internal private addressing, allowing RTP/RTCP packets to traverse the boundary. Although NAT is no longer required to be implemented, it is still a common security best practice.
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and related protocols used for call establishment and control rely on dedicated TCP ports that must be open inbound at all times to receive calls. Real-time Transfer Protocol (RTP) and Real-time Transfer Control Protocol (RTCP) use randomly assigned UDP ports in the range of 1025-65535 with four IP ports required for every bi-directional voice session. The number of ports is increased when video is added. The method of supporting VoIP through a standard data firewall is to open the signaling TCP ports and a broad range of UDP ports for the RTP/RTCP media streams. A data firewall does provide limited protection for VoIP implementations when inbound permit statements are restricted to specific address ranges. This is not possible if calls are to be permitted from any IP address on the Internet or NIPRNet.
VoIP stateful firewalls and session border controllers, in parallel with the data firewall, provide the best protection for the enclave. Dynamically opening required UDP ports to permit the flow of the media, performing stateful inspection of UDP media packets and dropping all non-session packets, and then closing the UDP ports at the session’s end or after an inactivity timeout greatly increases enclave protection. This configuration provides the capability to decrypt the media streams for inspection and recording. This supports, for CALEA purposes, the monitoring and recording of calls that traverse the enclave boundary.
When a VoIP system is a closed system, such as DISN classified networks, the entire address space of the WAN and connected enclaves is managed by a single system manager. In this instance, a specific limited and segregated address space may be assigned for all VoIP devices in use across the network. The risk to the enclave is limited when a standard firewall is used with inbound permit statements that are based on the segregated IP address range.
Furthermore, when NAT is used, the VoIP stateful firewall or session border controller provide RFC 1918 internal private addressing, allowing RTP/RTCP packets to traverse the boundary. Although NAT is no longer required to be implemented, it is still a common security best practice.
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