V7R2 changes
z/OS BMC CONTROL-D for TSS STIG V7R2 (2025-10-01) replaced V7R1 (2025-01-30): 8 checks updated. It has 9 checks, against 9 in V7R1.
V7R2 checklistV7R1 checklist Compare V7R1 and V7R2 in STIG Compare
- 0 added
- 0 removed
- 8 updated
Updated fields: Check text 8Fix text 6Discussion 2Title 1
Updated in V7R2 (8)
V-224578CAT IIBMC CONTROL-D configuration/parameter values are not specified properly.Check text
Check text
Refer to the following applicable reportsreport produced by the z/OS Data Collection:
- IOA.RPT(SECPARM).
Automated Analysis
Refer to the following report produced by the z/OS Data Collection:
- PDI(ZCTD0040).
TheIf the following keywords willspecify have the specified values in the BMC CONTROL-D security parameter member:, this is not a finding.
Keyword Value
DEFMCHKD $$CTDEDM
SECTOLD NO
DFMD01 EXTEND
DFMD04 EXTEND
DFMD08 EXTEND
DFMD19 EXTEND
DFMD23 EXTEND
DFMD24 EXTEND
DFMD26 EXTEND
DFMD27 EXTEND
V-224580CAT IIBMC CONTROL-D installation data sets will be properly protected.Check text, Fix text
Check text
Refer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:
- SENSITVE.RPT(CTDRPT).
Automated Analysis
Refer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:
- PDI(ZCTD0000).
Verify that the accesses to the BMC CONTROL-D installation data sets are properly restricted. If the following guidance is true, this is not a finding.
___ The TSS data set access authorizations restrict READ access to auditors, BMC users, security personnel (domain level and decentralized), and BMC STCs and/or batch users.
___ The TSS data set access authorizations restrict WRITE and/or greater access to systems programming personnel.
___ The TSS data set access authorizations specify that all (i.e., failures and successes) WRITE and/or greater access are logged.
Fix text
The ISSO will ensure that WRITE and/or greater access to BMC CONTROL-D installation data sets are limited to systems programmers only, and all WRITE and/or greater access is logged. READ access can be given to auditors, BMC users, security personnel (domain level and decentralized), and BMC STCs and/or batch users. All failures and successful WRITE and/or greater accesses are logged.
The installing systems programmer will identify and document the product data sets and categorize them according to who will have updateWRITE and/or altergreater access and if required that all updateWRITE and/or allocategreater access is logged. The installing systems programmer will identify if any additional groups have updateWRITE and/or altergreater access for specific data sets, and once documented will work with the ISSO to ensure they are properly restricted to the ACP (Access Control Program (ACP) active on the system.
(Note: The data sets and/or data set prefixes identified below are examples of a possible installation. The actual data sets and/or prefixes are determined when the product is actually installed on a system through the product's installation guide and can be site specific.)
Data sets to be protected will be:
SYS2.IOA.*.CTDI.
The following commands are provided as a sample for implementing data set controls:
TSS PERMIT(<syspaudt>) DSN(SYS2.IOA.*.CTDI.) ACCESS(R)
TSS PERMIT(<syspaudt>) DSN(SYS2.IOA.*.CTDI.) ACCESS(ALL) ACTION(AUDIT)
TSS PERMIT(<audtaudt>) DSN(SYS2.IOA.*.CTDI.) ACCESS(R)
TSS PERMIT(<bmcuser>) DSN(SYS2.IOA.*.CTDI.) ACCESS(R)
TSS PERMIT(<secaaudt>) DSN(SYS2.IOA.*.CTDI.) ACCESS(R)
TSS PERMIT(<secdaudt>) DSN(SYS2.IOA.*.CTDI.) ACCESS(R)
TSS PERMIT(<CONTROLD>) DSN(SYS2.IOA.*.CTDI.) ACCESS(R)
V-224581CAT IIBMC CONTROL-D STC data sets must be properly protected.Check text, Fix text
Check text
Refer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:
- SENSITVE.RPT(CTDSTC).
Automated Analysis
Refer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:
- PDI(ZCTD0001).
Verify that the accesses to the BMC CONTROL-D STC data sets are properly restricted. If the following guidance is true, this is not a finding.
___ The TSS data set access authorizations restrict READ access to auditors and CONTROL-D end users.
___ The TSS data set access authorizations restrict WRITE and/or greater access to systems programming personnel.
___ The TSS data set access authorizations restrict WRITE and/or greater access to BMC STCs and/or batch users.
___ The TSS data set access authorizations restrict UPDATE access to centralized and decentralized security personnel.
Fix text
The ISSO will ensure that WRITE and/or greater access to BMC CONTROL-D STC data sets are limited to systems programmers and BMC STCs and/or batch users. UPDATE access can be given to centralized and decentralized security personnel. READ access can be given to auditors and BMC users.
The installing systems programmer will identify and document the product data sets and categorize them according to who will have updateWRITE and/or altergreater access and if required that all updateWRITE and/or allocategreater access is logged. The installing systems programmer will identify if any additional groups have updateWRITE and/or altergreater access for specific data sets, and once documented will work with the ISSO to ensure they are properly restricted to the ACP (Access Control Program (ACP) active on the system.
(Note: The data sets and/or data set prefixes identified below are examples of a possible installation. The actual data sets and/or prefixes are determined when the product is actually installed on a system through the product's installation guide and can be site specific.)
Data sets to be protected will be:
SYS3.IOA.*.CTDO.
The following commands are provided as a sample for implementing data set controls:
TSS PERMIT(syspaudt) DSN(SYS3.IOA.*.CTDO.) ACCESS(ALL)
TSS PERMIT(tstcaudt) DSN(SYS3.IOA.*.CTDO.) ACCESS(ALL)
TSS PERMIT(BMC STCs) DSN(SYS3.IOA.*.CTDO.) ACCESS(ALL)
TSS PERMIT(secaaudt) DSN(SYS3.IOA.*.CTDO.) ACCESS(U)
TSS PERMIT(secdaudt) DSN(SYS3.IOA.*.CTDO.) ACCESS(U)
TSS PERMIT(audtaudt) DSN(SYS3.IOA.*.CTDO.) ACCESS(R)
TSS PERMIT(bmcuser) DSN(SYS3.IOA.*.CTDO.) ACCESS(R)
V-224582CAT IIBMC CONTROL-D user data sets must be properly protected.Check text, Fix text
Check text
Refer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:
- SENSITVE.RPT(CTMUSER).
Automated Analysis
Refer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:
- PDI(ZCTD0002).
Verify that the accesses to the BMC CONTROL-D User data sets are properly restricted. If the following guidance is true, this is not a finding.
___ The TSS data set access authorizations restrict READ access to auditors.
___ The TSS data set access authorizations restrict WRITE and/or greater access to systems programming personnel.
___ The TSS data set access authorizations restrict WRITE and/or greater access to the BMC CONTROL-D's STC(s) and/or batch user(s).
___ The TSS data set access authorizations restrict UPDATE access to centralized and decentralized security personnel, and/or CONTROL-D end users.
Fix text
The ISSO must ensure that WRITE and/or greater access to BMC CONTROL-D User data sets are limited to systems programmers and BMC STCs and/or batch users. Additionally, UPDATE access can be given to centralized and decentralized security personnel, and BMC users. READ access can be given to auditors.
The installing systems programmer will identify and document the product data sets and categorize them according to who will have updateWRITE and/or altergreater access and if required that all updateWRITE and/or allocategreater access is logged. The installing systems programmer will identify if any additional groups have updateWRITE and/or altergreater access for specific data sets, and once documented will work with the ISSO to ensure they are properly restricted to the ACP (Access Control Program (ACP) active on the system.
(Note: The data sets and/or data set prefixes identified below are examples of a possible installation. The actual data sets and/or prefixes are determined when the product is actually installed on a system through the product's installation guide and can be site specific.)
Data sets to be protected will be:
SYS3.IOA.*.CTDR.
CTRUSR.
CTDSRV.
CTDJB1.
The following commands are provided as a sample for implementing data set controls:
TSS PERMIT(syspaudt) DSN(SYS3.IOA.*.CTDR.) ACCESS(ALL)
TSS PERMIT(tstcaudt) DSN(SYS3.IOA.*.CTDR.) ACCESS(ALL)
TSS PERMIT(BMC STCs) DSN(SYS3.IOA.*.CTDR.) ACCESS(ALL)
TSS PERMIT(bmcuser) DSN(SYS3.IOA.*.CTDR.) ACCESS(U)
TSS PERMIT(secaaudt) DSN(SYS3.IOA.*.CTDR.) ACCESS(U)
TSS PERMIT(secdaudt) DSN(SYS3.IOA.*.CTDR.) ACCESS(U)
TSS PERMIT(audtaudt) DSN(SYS3.IOA.*.CTDR.) ACCESS(R)
TSS PERMIT(syspaudt) DSN(CTRUSR.) ACCESS(ALL)
TSS PERMIT(tstcaudt) DSN(CTRUSR.) ACCESS(ALL)
TSS PERMIT(BMC STCs) DSN(CTRUSR.) ACCESS(ALL)
TSS PERMIT(bmcuser) DSN(CTRUSR.) ACCESS(U)
TSS PERMIT(secaaudt) DSN(CTRUSR.) ACCESS(U)
TSS PERMIT(secdaudt) DSN(CTRUSR.) ACCESS(U)
TSS PERMIT(audtaudt) DSN(CTRUSR.) ACCESS(R)
TSS PERMIT(syspaudt) DSN(CTDSRV.) ACCESS(ALL)
TSS PERMIT(tstcaudt) DSN(CTDSRV.) ACCESS(ALL)
TSS PERMIT(BMC STCs) DSN(CTDSRV.) ACCESS(ALL)
TSS PERMIT(bmcuser) DSN(CTDSRV.) ACCESS(U)
TSS PERMIT(secaaudt) DSN(CTDSRV.) ACCESS(U)
TSS PERMIT(secdaudt) DSN(CTDSRV.) ACCESS(U)
TSS PERMIT(audtaudt) DSN(CTDSRV.) ACCESS(R)
TSS PERMIT(syspaudt) DSN(CTDJB1.) ACCESS(ALL)
TSS PERMIT(tstcaudt) DSN(CTDJB1.) ACCESS(ALL)
TSS PERMIT(BMC STCs) DSN(CTDJB1.) ACCESS(ALL)
TSS PERMIT(bmcuser) DSN(CTDJB1.) ACCESS(U)
TSS PERMIT(secaaudt) DSN(CTDJB1.) ACCESS(U)
TSS PERMIT(secdaudt) DSN(CTDJB1.) ACCESS(U)
TSS PERMIT(audtaudt) DSN(CTDJB1.) ACCESS(R)
V-224583CAT IIBMC CONTROL-D resources must be properly defined and protected.Check text
Check text
Refer to the following reportsreport produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:
- SENSITVE.RPT(ZCTD0020).
Automated Analysis
Refer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:
- PDI(ZCTD0020).
Verify that the accesses to resources and/or generic equivalent are properly restricted according to the requirements specified in BMC CONTROL-D Resources table in the z/OS STIG Addendum. If the following guidance is true, this is not a finding.
Note: To determine what resource class is used review the IOACLASS setting in SECPARM. The "Trigger" resources, i.e., $$SECxxx (xxx is unique to the product) are defined in the FACILITY resource class.
___ The TSS resources are owned or DEFPROT is specified for the resource class.
___ The TSS resource access authorizations restrict access to the appropriate personnel.
___ The TSS resource logging requirements are specified.
V-224584CAT IIBMC CONTROL-D Started Task name is not properly identified/defined to the system ACP.Title, Check text, Fix text, Discussion
Title
BMC CONTROL-D Started Task name is not properly identified / defined to the system ACP.
Check text
Refer to the following report produced by the TSS Data Collection:
- TSSCMDS.RPT(@ACIDS).
Review each BMC CONTROL-D STC/Batch ACID(s). forIf the following:
___ Defined withattributes Facilityare ofdefined, STCthis and/oris BATCH.
___ Definednot witha Master Facility of CONTROLDfinding.
___ IsFACILITY(STC, sourced to the BATCH)
PASSWORD(xxxxxxxx,0)
SOURCE(INTRDR.)
NOSUSPEND
MASTFAC(CONTROLD)
Fix text
The BMC CONTROL-D systemsystems programmer and the IAOISSO will ensure that a product's Started Task(s) is properly Identified identified/ defined to the Systemsystem ACP.
If the product requires a Started Task, verify that it is properly defined to the Systemsystem ACP with the proper attributes.
Most installation manuals will indicate how the Started Task is identified and any additional attributes that must be specified.
A sample is provided here:
TSS CREATE(CONTROLD) TYPE(USER) -
NAME('*STC* for CONTROL-D') DEPT(xxxx) -
FAC(STC) -
MASTFAC(CONTROLD) PASS(xxxxxxxx,0) -
SOURCE(INTRDR) NOSUSPEND
Discussion
BMC CONTROL-D requires a started task that will be restricted to certain resources, datasetsdata sets, and other system functions. ByDefining defining the started task as a userid to the system ACP, It allows the ACP to control the access and authorized users that require these capabilities. Failure to properly control these capabilities, could compromise of the operating system environment, ACP, and customer data.
V-224585CAT IIBMC CONTROL-D Started task(s) must be properly defined to the Started Task Table ACID for Top Secret.Check text, Fix text, Discussion
Check text
Refer to the following report produced by the TSS Data Collection:
- TSSCMDS.RPT(#STC).
Automated Analysis
Refer to the following report produced by the TSS Data Collection:
- PDI(ZCTD0032).
VerifyIf that the BMC CONTROL-D started task(s) is (are) defined in the TSS STC record, this is not a finding.
Fix text
The BMC CONTROL-D systemsystems programmer and the IAOISSO will ensure that a product's started task(s) is (are) properly identified and/or defined to the Systemsystem ACP.
A unique ACID must be assigned for the BMC CONTROL-D started task(s) thruthrough a corresponding STC table entry.
The following sample set of commands is shown here as a guideline:
TSS ADD(STC) PROCNAME(CONTOLD) ACID(CONTROLD)
Discussion
Access to product resources should be restricted to only those individuals responsible for the application connectivity and who have a requirement to access these resources. Improper control of product resources could potentially compromise the operating system, ACP, and customer data.
V-224586CAT IIBMC CONTROL-D is not properly defined to the Facility Matrix Table for Top Secret.Check text, Fix text
Check text
Refer to the following reportreports produced by the TSS Data Collection:
- TSSCMDS.RPT(FACLIST) - Preferred report containing all control option values in effect including default values.
- TSSCMDS.RPT(TSSPRMFL) - Alternate report containing only control option values explicitly coded at TSS startup.
EnsureIf the BMC CONTROL-D Facility Matrix table is defined as follows:, this is a finding.
FAC(USERxx=NAME=CONTROLD,PGM=CTD,ID=nn,ACTIVE,SHRPRF)
FAC(CONTROLD=ASUBM,NOABEND,MULTIUSER,NOXDEF,SIGN(S))
FAC(CONTROLD=RES,LUMSG,STMSG,WARNPW,NORNDPW)
FAC(CONTROLD=NOAUDIT,NOTSOC,MODE=FAIL)
FAC(CONTROLD=LOG(SMF,INIT,MSG,SEC9),UIDACID=8,LOCKTIME=000)
Fix text
The BMC CONTROL-D systemsystems programmer and the IAOISSO will ensure that the TOP SECRET Facility Matrix Table is proper defined using the following example:
CONTROLD:
FAC(USERxx=NAME=CONTROLD,PGM=CTO,ID=nn,ACTIVE,SHRPRF)
FAC(CONTROLD=ASUBM,NOABEND,MULTIUSER,NOXDEF)
FAC(CONTROLD=LUMSG,STMSG,SIGN(S),WARNPW,NORNDPW)
FAC(CONTROLD=NOAUDIT,RES,NOTSOC,MODE=FAIL)
FAC(CONTROLD=LOG(SMF,INIT,MSG,SEC9),UIDACID=8,LOCKTIME=000)
How these changes are found
Checks are matched across the two releases by V-number. A check counts as updated when DISA gave it a new rule revision (the r number in its SV-…_rule id) and its title, severity, check text, fix text, discussion, CCIs or other fields changed — the same comparison STIG Compare makes. Added checks are new V-numbers; removed checks are V-numbers V7R2 no longer has.
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